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 ABSTRACT 
Objective: This paper uses social movement theory to explain variation in local support for 
proposed constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage in 22 states during 2004 and 
2006.  Methods: The analysis uses OLS regression with county-level data to explain variation in 
local support for the amendments.  Results: Support for the amendments in both years was 
positively related to the proportion of a county that was evangelical or Republican, but 
negatively related to its level of education and proportion of Catholics.  Amendment support was 
positively related in only one year to the percentage of a county’s population that was 
professional, young, black, in female-headed households, and Mormon.   Amendment support 
was negatively related to the concentration of gay organizations in 2006, but positively related to 
the presence of megachurches in 2006.  Conclusions: Community characteristics have a 
substantial effect on levels of support for same-sex marriage bans, thus reinforcing the utility of 
cultural explanations of policy decisions. 
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 “Competing Social Movements and Local Political Culture: 
 Voting on Ballot Propositions to Ban Same-Sex Marriage in the American States” 
 
 Large-scale social movements during the twentieth century led to major policy changes in 
the United States, including the civil rights, women’s, and environmental movements.  Other, 
more conservative, movements developed to resist unwanted social changes and what many saw 
as the growing encroachment of government. 
   Scholars generally examine a social movement in terms of its grievances, resources, 
mobilization, and political opportunity structure (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: 14-18, 38-
71).  Based on the grievances of those who see themselves as marginalized or threatened, 
movements frequently rely on existing organizations in their initial stages, e.g., churches during 
the U.S. civil rights movement.  They also devote great effort to identity formation, which has 
increasingly become based on non-economic factors such as race, gender, sexual orientation, and 
disability.  Identity formation is critical to attracting and retaining members, making demands, 
and distinguishing the movement from both the targets of its actions and its opponents (Tilly, 
2004: 1-14, 65-71; Wald, Silverman, and Fridy, 2005: 125-131).  Identity serves as the 
foundation for political mobilization, which is expected to include a range of unconventional 
tactics (Tilly, 2004: 3-4).  Social movements are not a series of random protests, however, and 
resources for mobilizing “vary in form, quality, and quantity from movement to movement” and 
are not just material (Wald, Silverman, and Fridy, 2005: 131). 
 Most studies link a movement’s success to its available “political opportunities,” including 
events, political access points, and alliances.  Opportunities can be negative (i.e., threats), for 
which the actions of elites and counter-movements can be especially critical.  Over time, 
 
 2 
however, social movements can look more like traditional interest groups in using lobbying, 
campaign contributions, litigation, and similar “mainstream” techniques (Wald, Silverman, and 
Fridy, 2005: 136-140; Tarrow, 1994: 85-99, 165-169). 
 Some have argued that social movements, like public policies, vary substantially by place 
and time, particularly in settings with different political cultures.  Erikson, Wright, and McIver 
(1993, 2006) have shown strong links between the ideological disposition of a state’s residents 
and the types of policies that it adopts.  Likewise, the racial and ethnic diversity of a county had 
a significant effect on local support for state ballot measures to make English the “official” 
language and to restrict illegal immigrants’ access to government services (Hero, 1998).  In a test 
for the presence of a “religious threat,” David Campbell (2006) found that the likelihood of  
fundamentalists voting Republican was positively related to the relative size of the nonreligious 
population in their community.  Similarly, Sharp (2005) identified local political culture as one 
of the factors shaping “morality politics” in a sample of large American cities, particularly local 
government actions related to gay rights, drug programs, and abortion clinics.  Thus, a range of 
literature suggests that local context matters for the policy gains of social movements.  This 
might be especially true for the gay and lesbian movement and the Christian right. 
 
Competing Movements 
 Conservative Christian activists are nothing new in U.S. politics (Wilcox, 1992).  As the 
modern movement developed, it built networks around congregations, Christian bookstores and 
schools, and a variety of local groups.  Greater visibility, potential to evangelize, and closer ties 
to politics came with the rise of TV evangelists, the birth of organizations such as Christian 
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Voice and the Moral Majority, and Pat Robertson’s 1988 presidential campaign.  The Christian 
Right built a national and local presence that contested what were seen as threats to both 
traditional values and religion more generally.  In addition to homosexuality, activists mobilized 
over issues like abortion, home schooling and school curricula, public religious displays and 
exercises, pornography, divorce, euthanasia, and stem cell research.  Such efforts found allies 
among secular conservatives, including prominent Republican politicians (Wilcox, 1992: 10-20; 
Gibson, 2004; Green, Rozell, and Wilcox, 2003). 
 The earliest efforts at a gay rights movement occurred during the 1950s and 1960s in cities 
such as New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Washington.  National groups proliferated 
during the 1970s and 1980s, with state organizations generally established later.  The original 
aims of the movement were eliminating state sodomy laws and medical protocols classifying 
homosexuality as a psychological disorder.  Later campaigns dealt with legal protection from 
discrimination (mainly in communities with a gay and lesbian presence), AIDS, and the ban on 
homosexuals in the U.S. military.  Most recently, activists have sought changes in policies such 
as employment benefits for same-sex couples, adoption, child custody, and the contractual 
characteristics of marriage.  Efforts have also expanded government to target religious 
denominations, nonprofit organizations, and private-sector employers (Wald, Button, and 
Rienzo, 1996; D’Emilio, 1998; Nownes, 2004; Mezey, 2007: chap. 1). 
 By the late 1990s, both the gay rights movement and the Christian Right included multiple 
organizations, headquarters buildings, professional staffs, election efforts, lobbying, and other 
characteristics of interest groups.  To be sure, elements within each still used unconventional 
tactics, but seldom have competing social movements faced each other directly at the ballot box 
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like Christian conservatives and the gay rights movement did in the constitutional amendment 
campaigns over same-sex marriage (see Rimmerman and Wilcox, 2007). 
 
Battling over Marriage 
 Litigation by gay organizations in the early 1990s prompted Christian activists and 
Republican politicians to promote laws to prevent recognition of same-sex marriage, including 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton in 
1996.  Fourteen states passed laws that year banning same-sex marriage, as did another ten in 
1997 (Mezey, 2007: 94-102).  Because state courts could still strike down such statutes under 
their respective constitutions, the Christian Right sought stronger protections for traditional 
marriage with constitutional amendments at the state and national levels. 
 Marriage debates intensified after the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the remaining state 
sodomy laws in June 2003 and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opened marriage in 
that state to same-sex couples a few months later.  Some local officials responded by issuing 
marriage licenses and performing ceremonies, although outside Massachusetts, such efforts were 
halted by injunction or other legal means (Mezey, 2007: 104-113).  Opponents of same-sex 
marriage heightened their mobilization, often with attacks on “activist” judges.  In early 2004, 
President George W. Bush publicly stated his support for a U.S. constitutional amendment 
limiting marriage to one man and one woman.  Republican efforts in Congress to submit such an 
amendment to the states for ratification failed.  The two political parties and their candidates 
clashed over the issue throughout the 2004 election campaign (Mezey, 2007: 113-119). 
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   Within this intense national debate, these two social movements engaged each other at 
two stages in each state: getting amendments on the ballot and campaigning over ratification.  
Proposed amendments reached the ballot in thirteen states during 2004, six as a result of state 
initiative procedures.  Missouri held its vote in August, Louisiana did so in September, and the 
remaining eleven states voted in November on the same day as the presidential election.  All 
thirteen of the amendments were ratified – eleven of them by more than 60 percent of voters.  
Evidence from Michigan and Ohio suggests that these ballot measures did not boost turnout, but 
did enhance President Bush’s margin of victory (Hillygus and Shields, 2005; Smith, DeSantis, 
and Kassel, 2006). 
 In 2006, the Christian Right and its Republican allies got legislatures to place amendments 
on the ballot in six states (Alabama, Idaho, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin) 
and used the initiative process in three others (Arizona, Colorado, and South Dakota).  The 
Democratic party made substantial gains in these off-year elections, and marriage amendments 
were more closely contested, including a defeat in Arizona, more counties voting against 
ratification, and fewer counties backing amendments by large majorities. 
 Save Oregon and Wisconsin, the 22 states voting on amendments already had a law 
banning same-sex marriage.  Ten states still had sodomy laws when the U.S. Supreme Court 
overturned them in 2003.  Several states, most notably Colorado and Oregon, previously had gay 
rights issues on the ballot.  Only Oregon provided domestic-partner benefits and had 
nondiscrimination and hate crimes laws covering sexual orientation by 2000; Kentucky, 
Louisiana, and Missouri also had hate crimes laws.  There was substantial policy variation at the 
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local level, however, once again suggesting the importance of local political culture, political 
opportunities, and mobilization (Green, Rozell, and Wilcox, 2003; van der Meide, 2000). 
 
Research Design 
 The analysis below examines the 2004 and 2006 ballot measures.  The unit of analysis is 
the county, which ranges from 15 in Arizona to 159 in Georgia.  The dependent variable is the 
percent of “yes” votes on the proposed amendment in the county.  Election returns are from each 
state’s secretary of state or elections board.  Population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Based on social movement theory, independent variables will be used to assess the impact of 
political culture, opportunity structure, and mobilization capacity. 
Independent Variables 
 Political Culture.   Rather than label counties as dominated by a specific political culture 
(e.g., traditionalistic), we measure the concept indirectly based on population characteristics, 
which permits us to use several continuous variables.  The goal remains to examine the extent to 
which community characteristics shape its public policies.  Survey research does suggest the 
types of groups that might be most supportive and opposed to same-sex marriage.  For example, 
support for amendments to ban same-sex marriage should be weaker in cities with a high 
concentration of the young and better educated – what Richard Florida (2005) labels the 
“creative class.”  Similarly, Sharp (2005: 22-38) classifies cities as having an “unconventional” 
subculture based on the presence of nontraditional households.  Thus, one would hypothesize a 
negative relationship between a county’s level of support for these amendments and its 
educational level, percentage of young people, and percentage of female-headed households. 
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 Our measure of educational attainment is the percentage of a county’s residents age 25 and 
older in 2000 with a bachelor’s degree or higher.  The relative “youth” of a county is measured 
as the percentage of its population between the ages of 18 and 24 in 2000.  This group was born 
between 1976 and 1982, and thus 30 or under during the amendment campaigns.  Finally, the 
“creative class” is the percentage of the civilian work force in 2000, age 16 and over, that is 
employed in professional or related occupations: computer and mathematical; architecture and 
engineering; life, physical, and social science; social service; legal; arts, design, entertainment, 
sports, and media; and health care and technical occupations.  Because more urbanized areas are 
expected to be more “gay-friendly,” we hypothesize that a county’s population density 
(population per square mile) is negatively related to amendment support.. 
 There is uncertainty about how a community’s racial and ethnic mix might influence issues 
related to homosexuality (see Wald, Button, and Rienzo, 1996).  On the one hand, some would 
expect that the history of civil rights in the United States might prompt minorities to sympathize 
with proposals that seem to extend rights to other marginalized groups.  However, as national 
opinion polls indicate (Pew Research Center For The People & The Press, 2003, 2006b), African 
Americans tend to be strong opponents of same-sex marriage, but Hispanics are more evenly 
divided on the matter.  Thus, one might hypothesize that a county’s support for amendments 
would be positively related to its percentage of blacks and Hispanics.  For the former, we include 
those who self-identify as black or African American only rather than two or more races. 
 Political Opportunity Structure.  A movement’s political opportunity structure includes 
both possible alliances and threats.  One such indicator is the extent to which local governments 
have adopted gay-friendly policies.  Such policies suggest that interest groups, activists, and 
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politicians have built winning coalitions that might be sympathetic to the gay rights movement.   
Thus, we included the percentage of a county’s population living in jurisdictions where the 
government and/or private sector were required to provide domestic partner benefits as of 2000.  
With over 100 local nondiscrimination ordinances in place by the late 1990s, a second variable is 
the percentage of the county’s population in jurisdictions with such ordinances (Wald, Button, 
and Rienzo, 1996; van der Meide, 2000).1  We expect both to be negatively related to a county’s 
percentage voting “yes” on proposed amendments. 
 A community’s ideological and partisan make-up are also likely to affect alliances on 
social issues.  There are no measures of ideology available at the county level, but given the 
positions of the two political parties on the marriage issue, one would hypothesize that the more 
Republicans a county is, the higher its support for an amendment.  Partisanship is difficult to 
measure since the majority of these states does not require voters to register by party.  As a 
measure of Republican strength, we use the percentage of votes for George W. Bush in the 
previous presidential election. 
 Also in terms of alliances and threats, two factors are expected to have opposite effects on 
amendment support.  A larger Christian Right presence in a county should produce higher levels 
of amendment support, especially in a presidential year, when religious conservatives could be 
expected to be highly mobilized (Campbell, 2006; Wilcox and Sigelman, 2001).  On the other 
hand, a larger gay and lesbian presence in a community should be associated with a higher 
percentage of “no” votes (Wald, Button, and Rienzo, 1996; Haider-Markel, Joslyn, and Kniss, 
2000; Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel, 2006). 
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 The Census Bureau does not count people based on sexual orientation or religion.  The best 
data source on religion in American communities is a decennial survey of congregations by the 
Glenmary Research Center.  The data are not without their problems, including omission of 
independent congregations, reliance on an overall estimate for Jews in each county without 
differentiation among branches of Judaism, and the lack of systematic data on historically black 
denominations (Jones et al., 2002: xiii).  Glenmary sums the number of “adherents” reported for 
each congregation, as well as its average attendance, with the results aggregated by religious 
affiliation for each county.  In calculating the Christian Right presence in each county, we 
followed the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA, 2006) classification of 73 
Protestant denominations as “evangelical,” ranging from the huge Southern Baptist Convention 
to many other groups of Baptists, several types of Mennonites, and a range of other faiths. 
 One analysis of 1996 national survey data found Religious Right identification associated 
with theological positions (e.g., Biblical inerrancy) and a socioreligious movement membership 
(e.g., Pentecostal, traditional Catholic), along with conservative positions on social issues (Hood 
and Smith, 2002).  Thus, it is important to code denominations based on beliefs, not merely 
being conservative (see Gibson, 2004).  A county’s percentages of Mormons and Catholics, 
whose church leaders have opposed same-sex marriage, but are not classified as evangelical by 
ARDA, are two additional independent variables.  Counties for which adherents add to more 
than 100 percent of the population in the survey are omitted. 
 In terms of a gay and lesbian presence, the 2000 census included a questionnaire sent to a 
sample asking for the sex and relationships of household members.  Only 0.6 percent of the 105 
million U.S. households were occupied by same-sex couples, as compared to the slightly more 
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than 4 percent of households inhabited by opposite-sex, unmarried partners.  Same-sex 
households for the 22 states examined here ranges from zero to 1.35 percent in Pima County 
(Tucson), Arizona, and 2.1 percent in Shannon County, South Dakota.  Obviously, the census 
underestimates the gay and lesbian population by not counting homosexuals living alone or 
unwilling to self-identify.  Nevertheless, same-sex households as a percentage of all households 
is the most direct measure of gay presence available at the county level. 
 Mobilization.  Social movement theory also places great importance on resource 
mobilization, which involves networks and organizations capable of getting people to volunteer, 
contribute, and vote.  It is impossible to measure mobilization directly at the local level for these 
amendment campaigns.  However, the presence of certain organizations in each county 
represents mobilization potential, or what Wald, Button, and Rienzo (1996: 1158-1160) labeled 
“political capacity.” 
 One major seedbed for supporting these amendments could be so-called megachurches.  
The Hartford Institute for Religion Research (2005) lists megachurches in terms of average 
weekly worship attendance of at least 2,000 people in 2005, a “charismatic, authoritative senior 
minister,” a “very active” daily “congregational community,” a “multitude” of ministries, and a 
“complex differentiated” structure.  The Institute’s database includes almost 500 congregations 
in the 22 states analyzed here. 
 On the opponents’ side, the number of gay and lesbian organizations is available from two 
annual guides that have been used in previous studies (Damron Company 2004a, 2004b).  The 
guides list local information lines, social service agencies, congregations and spiritual groups, 
and other nonprofits, as well as businesses such as publications, bars, restaurants, lodging 
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establishments, and retailers.  The total of such organizations in these 22 states is just over 1,000.  
Both guides identify businesses known to be gay-owned, but the measure used here might 
undercount possible mobilization because it excludes organizations and businesses listed as 
“gay-friendly” in the guides, larger organizations that target gays and lesbians to some extent, 
and entities that could not be identified with a specific county, e.g., a regional gay newspaper. 
 For both gay organizations and megachurches, street addresses were mapped against 
county boundaries with both print atlases and on-line searches.  We then calculated the number 
of gay organizations and megachurches per 100,000 residents for each county. 
 Finally, we control for the timing of elections.  All but three states (Missouri in August 
2004, Louisiana in September 2004, and Alabama in June 2006) voted on amendments at the 
same time as national elections, when political parties, candidates, and the media are more likely 
to inform and mobilize voters.  Thus, we include a variable (November = 1) to control for such 
effects. 
Findings 
Explaining Variation in Local Support 
 Table 1 reports OLS results of support for these amendments by county, with robust 
standard errors.2  Standard checks revealed no multicollinearity threats in the two models.3 
 <Table 1 about here> 
 Four variables stand out as statistically significant and with signs in the expected direction 
for both years.  Most notably, education had the greatest negative impact on amendment support 
in both years.  In 2004, this meant that for every ten percent increase in a county’s population 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher, there was a corresponding 7.4 percent decrease in support for 
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a same-sex marriage ban.  Republican partisanship, measured as the percent support for George 
W. Bush in the previous presidential election, had a strong positive effect on the percent casting 
a “yes” vote.  The concentration of evangelicals in a county also had a positive effect on support, 
although the size of this coefficient is noticeably larger in 2006.  Finally, the larger the Catholic 
proportion of a county’s population, the lower its support for these amendments. 
 There are also some noteworthy differences between the two years.  Turning first to 2004, 
there are positive relationships between amendment support and the percent black, the percent of 
a county’s residents age 18-24 in 2000, and the percent in professional occupations.  The positive 
effect of black concentration on amendment support is consistent with survey data showing 
African Americans among the groups that are most hostile to same-sex marriage.  The other two 
variables have positive signs, which is contrary to expectations.  Surprisingly, none of these three 
variables reached the .05 level of statistical significance in 2006.  The concentration of gay 
organizations had a negative effect on a county’s vote in favor marriage bans – the only 
mobilization measure to reach statistical significance in 2004.  Surprisingly, the November 
dummy variable had a slight negative effect on support, suggesting that amendment opponents 
were able to mobilize better in the 2004 general election than in the earlier elections in Missouri 
and Louisiana, when national offices were not on the ballot and the debate over amendments had 
not reached such a frenzy. 
 In 2006, percent female-headed households, percent Mormon, and the concentration of 
megachurches were positively related to support.  None of these variables reached statistical 
significance in 2004.   The latter two variables behaved as hypothesized.  However, the 
concentration of female-headed households had a sign opposite the one hypothesized and 
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contrary to the image of an “unconventional” subculture, possibly because Sharp (2005) looked 
only at central cities, whereas the data here also cover suburban and rural counties.  The 
remaining variables failed to reach the .05 level of significance in either regression equation. 
The Role of State-Level Factors 
 It seems quite likely that the effect of local-level factors, such as the political opportunity 
structure, may be conditioned by state factors, such as state ideology, spending, and awareness.   
However, OLS regression does not account for the hierarchical structure of counties “nested” 
within states.  One possible approach to modeling this relationship is to use an interactive model 
in which there is a cross-level interaction between state variables and county-level variables.  
Such models have the advantage of accounting for causal heterogeneity (i.e., the possibility that 
different state factors affect different kinds of counties in varying ways), unlike the least-squares 
dummy variable approach.4  However, Steenbergen and Jones (2002: 221) argue that, “because 
interactive models incorporate random error only at the lowest level of analysis [but] at the 
higher levels of analysis (i.e., subgroups) the error components are assumed to be zero.  This is a 
very strong assumption that will usually prove to be false.”  Therefore, they conclude that the 
statistical problems associated with this approach outweigh its benefits. 
 Increasingly, researchers in political science, sociology, public health, and education utilize 
multilevel, or hierarchical, models (HLM) to address the issue of hierarchically structured data.  
In HLM, level one represents the lowest level of analysis (i.e., the county in this study), while 
level two represents the groups to which the level-one units belong (i.e., states). 
 This method, too, presents statistical problems.  While the number of level-one 
observations is high for both 2004 (973) and 2006 (601), the number of level-two observations 
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for each year is quite low (13 and 9).  Bowers and Drake (2005: 301-303) explain that the N at 
the highest level of analysis is the most restrictive element in the research design and advocate 
large sample sizes for all levels of analysis.  A small level-two N, like a small N in a single-level 
model, will produce inconsistent estimates and unreliable hypothesis tests.  Maas and Hox 
(2002) suggest a minimum N of 50.  Consequently, even combining the 2004 and 2006 data, the 
level-two N would yield 22 states – too low to provide reliable estimates.  Bowers and Drake 
(2005: 303-304) suggest an alternative way to analyze hierarchically structured data without 
using HLM inappropriately: “graphical presentations of the data rather than formal hypothesis 
testing [permits] analysts to tell compelling stories and to assess the implications of theories 
while remaining honest about what kinds of inference a given research design will bear.” 
 Several state-level characteristics seem most likely to influence the magnitude of local-
level effects across states: money spent on the amendment, state ideology, and the effects of 
campaigns for state offices.  For example, two counties with the same percentage of evangelicals 
might have different levels of amendment support as a consequence of differences between their 
two states in campaign spending.  A series of scatterplots with counties as the units of analysis 
(not shown here, but available from the authors) reveals some notable patterns.  First, in terms of 
state political culture, the relationship between the evangelical presence in a county and its level 
of amendment support in 2004 is stronger in the least conservative quartile of states than in the 
most conservative states.  This is consistent with Campbell’s (2006) expectation of voters 
responding to a religious “threat.”  It also suggests the problem of motivating voters when their 
side seems very likely to win.  There is little difference in county support in 2006, however, 
based on state ideology. 
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 Second, in terms of mobilization, we divided states into quartiles based on the percentage 
of total spending attributable to amendment supporters.  For both 2004 and 2006, in the quartile 
of states with the lowest dominance by pro-amendment spending, the share of evangelicals in a 
county had a stronger and more positive relationship with support than in the highest-spending 
quartile.  Third, and in terms of the effects of state campaigns on mobilization, the relationship 
between a county’s partisanship and its amendment support was unaffected by the percentage of 
state legislators also on the ballot that year. 
 
Discussion 
 Several points are worth emphasizing.  First are differences between the two years, which 
are highlighted by the value of the constants: with other terms equal to zero, amendment support 
would be 55 percent in 2004, but only 41 percent in 2006.  One explanation might be that the 
Christian Right mobilized earlier in states that were easy to win.  Indeed, many of the states 
voting in 2004 had a history of political activism by the Christian Coalition and similar 
organizations (Green, Rozell, and Wilcox, 2003).  Six of the thirteen states had legislatures run 
by Republicans, who controlled one house in three other states. The four remaining states had 
Democratic legislatures (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma), but were among the 
dozen most conservative states (Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993, 2006).  In 2006, Alabama, 
Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee were also among the dozen most 
conservative states.  There were also four more moderate states, three of which (Arizona, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin) had Republican legislatures, and in the fourth (Colorado), the measure 
got to the ballot because the initiative process bypassed the Democratic legislature. 
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 Another reason for differences is that opponents of marriage bans might have mounted 
more effective campaigns in the 2006 rematch.  Some changes were rhetorical, as with the 
activists who avoided using the term “marriage” in favor of “fairness” and “diversity” (Beyond 
Marriage, 2006).  Mobilization also increased.  In Wisconsin, for example, the amendment 
passed by 59-41 percent, but efforts by opponents, especially on college campuses, helped 
Democrats gain control of the upper house in the legislature and reduced the Republican majority 
substantially in the lower house (Spivak and Bice, 2006).  There were also substantial differences 
in fund raising.  In 2004, amendment backers and opponents each spent around $6.5 million 
across the thirteen states.  In 2006, however, opponents spent more than $14 million, while 
amendment supporters spent only $4 million in the nine states (Moore, 2007). 
 Attitudes also could have shifted, especially after several states extended some form of 
recognition to same-sex couples.  Polls generally reveal that support for homosexual rights in the 
U.S. has increased substantially since the late 1970s, but that does not extend to gay marriage, 
which was favored by only 32 percent of Americans in October 2003.  By summer 2005, that 
support rose slightly, to 36 percent, but 55 percent of Americans favored arrangements such as 
civil unions (Pew Research Center For The People & The Press, 2003, 2005, 2006b; Olson, 
Cadge, and Harrison, 2006).  This ambivalence was evident in Colorado, which had competing 
ballot measures in 2006.  Only 30 of the state’s 64 counties took a firm stand against gay rights 
by voting in favor of banning same sex marriage and against recognizing domestic partnerships. 
 The political context for these two campaigns was also different.  The 2004 amendments 
came on the heels of controversial court rulings that gave impetus to the amendment campaigns.  
They were also contested in the middle of a presidential campaign that highlighted social issues 
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and in a year when President Bush’s approval ratings ranged between 43 and 58 percent.  In 
2006, Bush’s approval ratings hovered between 33 and 40 percent, and Iraq was the preeminent 
issue, with the country decidedly more negative on the war than two years earlier (Pew Research 
Center For The People & The Press, 2006a). 
 Our results also have several implications.  At a basic level, local context matters in 
statewide campaigns.  This is contrary to the overly broad classification of states in partisan or 
ideological terms (“red” vs. “blue” in the media).  Most notably, a community’s partisanship, 
education level, and religious make-up are key determinants of policies associated with the so-
called culture wars.  Some characteristics were contrary to expectations, however.  For instance, 
a higher concentration of Catholics was associated with lower amendment support in both years.  
A larger presence may increase the diversity of Catholics in a community, but gay rights is one 
of a number of social issues with differences between the church’s official position and the 
opinions of those in the pews.  Other variables did not perform the same in both years.  They still 
suggest, though, that pro-amendment groups might successfully court African Americans and 
Mormons as allies and use churches to mobilize supporters.  Moreover, analysis of state-level 
spending and ideology suggest that evangelical presence in a county has less effect in states that 
are more conservative and have a larger spending advantage in favor of amendments – results 
that seem consistent with Campbell’s (2006) concept of a religious response to perceived secular 
threat.  On the other side, opponents might be able to use gay and lesbian organizations to 
mobilize, but they could find their task easier when high-profile offices are on the ballot, and 
voters might already be attentive, as suggested by the November dummy variable in 2006. 
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 The results also reinforce the value of social movement theory as a useful framework for 
studying these ballot measures, especially in terms of political opportunities and resource 
mobilization.  There is little reason to doubt that these two movements will continue to confront 
each other.  The findings bolster the viability of cultural explanations of public policy decisions 
(Sharp, 2005), especially those involving a referendum, which is true “issue voting” that is a 
useful complement to survey data about people’s attitudes about issues. 
 There are some questions our data cannot address.  In particular, community characteristics 
can only identify conditions or settings that might be favorable to either side in campaigns.  Our 
models performed reasonably well, but they cannot analyze conflict “in the trenches” of day-to-
day politics.  They do suggest the need to assess specific mobilization strategies (television and 
radio advertising, leafleting at churches, door-to-door campaigns, etc.).  Understanding those 
processes requires a different mix of qualitative and quantitative research strategies than are 
available from our data. 
 Finally, candidates, parties, and interest groups have gotten quite adept at using state 
constitutional amendments to promote a variety of political agendas.  Their success will depend, 
though, on how well they understand the local settings in which they campaign. 
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Table 1: OLS Regression of Percent Support for Marriage Amendments 
Independent Variables 2004a 2006b 
Political Culture   
% college graduates, 2000 -.746*  (.061) -.340* (.089) 
% age 18-24, 2000 .227* (.092) -.181 (.122) 
% professional occupations, 2000 .257* (.115) -.097 (.170) 
% female-headed households, 2000 .089 (.069) .663* (.253) 
% same-sex households, 2000 1.994 (1.58) -2.689 (4.438) 
density (population per square mile), 2000 .000003 (.000004) -.00001 (.000008) 
% black, 2000 .151* (.021) .036 (.051) 
% Hispanic, 2000 -.135 (.083) .114 (.065) 
% evangelical, 2000 .133* (.012) .440* (.058) 
% Catholic, 2000 -.078* (.016) -.204* (.056) 
% Mormon, 2000 -.023 (.017) .152* (.042) 
Political Opportunity Structure   
% vote for Bush, 2000/2004 .402* (.024) .344* (.072) 
% pop. with domestic partner coverage, 2000 .006 (.044) -.006 (.074) 
% pop. with nondiscrimination coverage, 2000 .019 (.012) -.054 (.073) 
Mobilization   
 
 20 
megachurches per 100,000 residents, 2005 .004 (.004) .005* (.002) 
gay organizations per 100,000 residents, 2004 -.006* (.001) -.0005 (.0013) 
November election -.028* (.004) .002 (.014) 
constant .552* (.022) .408* (.072) 
R2 .679 .692 
Number of counties 973 338 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < .05, two-tailed. 
a2004 states are Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. 
b2006 states are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1. Our measure of population living in jurisdictions with gay-friendly ordinances is a  
conservative estimate.  We exclude governments offering only no-cost, ‘soft’ benefits such as 
hospital visitation, as well as those providing only a domestic partner registry.  The measure 
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includes employment (government or private) or housing discrimination.  For counties, it 
includes that portion of its population living outside city boundaries. 
2. To account for differences in statewide campaigns, we also ran the model with errors 
clustered on the state.  However, when using the cluster option, STATA reported a missing F-
statistic for the model because the variance-covariance matrix was not of sufficient rank to 
perform the model test.  By using robust standard errors to relax the independence of errors 
assumption, STATA reports an F-statistic that indicates the model as a whole is significant (F = 
134.49, p < .000) and produces identical coefficients and standard errors to the model with 
clustered errors.  Therefore, we report the model with robust standard errors. 
3. To check for multicollinearity among our variables, we computed the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) after running the models, as well as the matrix of correlations between estimated 
coefficients, and found that no correlation exceeded .90.  Because OLS requires only that no 
perfect collinearity exists and is relatively robust to minor violations of its assumptions, we do 
not believe that multicollinearity is affecting our outcomes. 
4. The least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach, in contrast, is not hampered by the 
statistical problems of the interactive model, but fails to explain why the regression regimes for 
various groups are different (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220-221).  Luke (2004) also cautions 
that, when there are many groups, LSDV reduces the degrees of freedom in a model and curtails 
parsimony. 
